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Abstract   
Previous research found that both Indian acquirer and target firms earned abnormal 
positive stock returns around the announcement of an acquisition. This work will explore up-to-
date changes in shareholder value creation around acquisition announcement, as measured by 
cumulative abnormal stock returns, for acquirers of Indian firms over time. Subgroups within the 
data sample will also be compared. A sample of fifty-five acquisitions of Indian target firms 
purchased by public acquirers with announcement dates ranging from 2000 to 2018 was 
analyzed using event study methodology. For each acquirer in the sample, daily abnormal stock 
returns were aggregated to produce cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) values over 
fourteen-day (ten days prior to three days post announcement date) and three-day (one day prior 
to one day post announcement date) event periods. Average fourteen-day and three-day CAR 
values were negative for the full sample, and averages were significantly different over time and 
between subgroups. Regression analysis was then used to examine changes in CAR values over 
time in more depth for the full sample and six subgroups of acquirers: domestic, cross-border, 
acquirers of private Indian firms, acquirers of public Indian firms, small, and large. Results 
showed that abnormal stock returns around acquisition announcement date are trending toward 
zero for acquirers of Indian target firms, which is more consistent with results expected in 
developed markets. Additionally, return trends vary greatly between different groups of 
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Based on extensive research findings, it is expected that acquirers will have zero-to-
slightly negative abnormal stock returns around acquisition announcement date. Despite this, 
previous research found that both Indian acquirers and acquirers of Indian target firms earned 
significantly positive abnormal returns around announcement date in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Today, there is a lag in available research on the topic, with most papers only covering through 
the beginning of this decade, at the latest. This paper will examine acquisitions of Indian target 
firms to discover how acquirer shareholder value creation around announcement date, as 
measured by cumulative abnormal stock returns, has changed over time. The sample includes 
fifty-five majority acquisitions of Indian target firms by public acquirers with announcement 
dates ranging from 2000 to 2018. It is predicted that positive abnormal stock returns for acquirers 
of Indian firms have decreased over time as the Indian economic system became more efficient 
and the country’s mergers and acquisitions market became more saturated. 
Domestic and cross-border acquirers, acquirers of private and public Indian firms, and 
acquirers with below and above sample median revenue (small and large acquirers) will also be 
analyzed as subgroups to compare changes in cumulative abnormal return (CAR) values over 
time between groups. Acquirer revenue, announced total value, domestic versus cross-border 
acquirers, and acquirers of private versus public Indian firms will also be examined as 
independent variables in regressions to better understand their relationships with abnormal 
acquirer value creation around announcement date.  
In 1991, the Indian government introduced the New Industrial Policy, which was the first 
step in liberalizing its economy and allowing mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to occur regularly 
within the country. After the implementation of this policy, other pro-business regulation 
followed, including the introduction of a policy that allowed Indian firms to invest significantly 
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more in outward foreign direct investment in 2004 and the removal of a requirement of approval 
from the Reserve Bank of India for outward foreign direct investment in 2005. Additionally, 
capital market regulations were loosened for Indian firms around the same time, giving them 
significantly greater access to both domestic and international capital markets by the early 2000s. 
Because of this, it has been argued that the “true opening” of the Indian economy occurred in the 
early 2000s, particularly 2004, as stated by Nayyar (2008) and Banerjee et al. (2014) in their 
respective papers on India’s M&A market. Indian M&A activity has increased greatly due to 
these regulation changes. In 2018, India’s M&A market was valued at $99.9 billion, showing 
immense growth from the previous year and making it the second-most targeted country in the 
world for acquisitions. Additionally, as the world’s fastest-growing large economy, the outlook 
for continued M&A growth is positive.  
This research can provide companies interested in purchasing an Indian firm with 
information on both changes in shareholder value creation around acquisition announcement date 
over time and with different deal characteristics. Results from this research can also be compared 
to acquirer value creation around announcement date in developed markets and other developing 
economies. Comparisons to historical trends in developed-country M&A markets can be used to 
make predictions about the future of Indian M&A.  
The next section of this paper will provide an overview of existing literature relating to 
mergers and acquisitions in India and other relevant topics. Following that, hypotheses regarding 
changes over time in acquirer value creation in acquisitions involving Indian target firms and 
differences in acquirer returns between subgroups will be provided. Then, a detailed 
methodology description will be shared, techniques for analyzing relevant data will be described 





I. Mergers & Acquisitions in Developing Countries  
Research on mergers and acquisitions involving firms in developing nations has become 
more common over the past few decades, but still lags behind research on mergers and 
acquisitions in developed nations. Existing works emphasize the fact that firms located in BRIC 
nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China), some of the largest developing countries, have become 
popular targets for cross-border mergers and acquisitions in recent years. Garabato (2009) credits 
this to the lifting of many economic sanctions in these nations in the 1990s, relatively cheap 
skilled labor, and a growing number of BRIC middle-class consumers.  
As reported by Distler (2018), many papers find that acquirers in developed-country M&A 
markets have zero-to-slightly negative abnormal returns around announcement date. However, 
this is often not the case for acquirers in developing markets, where positive abnormal stock 
returns around acquisition announcement have commonly been reported in recent decades. For 
example, Stephen Dorai and Patolahti (2010) analyze thirty acquisitions involving United 
Kingdom-based acquirers and BRIC-based targets from 1999 to 2009 and report that acquirers 
earned significantly positive abnormal returns of 1.0%, on average, around acquisition 
announcement.  
  However, in a more recent research publication, Kinateder, Fabich, and Wagner (2017) 
find that abnormal acquirer stock returns in developing-market M&A are more consistent with 
those traditionally found for acquirers in developed-market M&A. In their sample of fifty 
domestic acquisitions within BRIC nations from 2006 to 2015, average acquirer stock returns 
were slightly negative, but not significantly different than zero, while target firm stock returns 
were significantly positive. 
II. Indian Merger & Acquisition Market 
a. Policy and Deregulation  
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 The New Industrial Policy of 1991 was the first major step in liberalizing the Indian 
economy. However, Banerjee et al. (2014) argue that the true opening of India’s economy and 
M&A market occurred in 2004 due to additional policy implementations and regulation 
removals. According to Nayyar (2008), this was driven by the introduction of a policy that 
allowed Indian firms to invest 100% of their net worth in outward foreign direct investment in 
2004, which was shortly followed by the removal of a requirement of approval from the Reserve 
Bank of India for outward foreign direct investment. Additionally, capital market regulations 
were loosened for Indian firms, and by the early 2000s, they had significantly greater access to 
both domestic and international capital markets, which undoubtedly contributed to the large 
increase in Indian M&A activity at that time.  
b. Mergers & Acquisitions of Indian Target Firms 
Research that analyzes mergers and acquisitions of  Indian target firms in greater detail finds 
that acquirers earn significantly positive abnormal returns around announcement date. For 
example, Ma, Pagan, and Chu (2009) analyze 1,477 acquisitions of firms in ten emerging Asian 
economies from 2000 to 2005, 134 of which involved Indian target firms. For the whole sample, 
average CAR values are significantly positive for two (0 to +1), three (-1 to +1), and five-day (-2 
to +2) event periods. Acquirers of Indian target firms also created abnormal positive value, on 
average, over the event periods studied.  
In a different paper, Kale (2004) analyzes 698 acquisitions that occurred in India from 1992 
to 2002 and found that there was a large increase in acquisition activity in the country in the 
early 2000s. The work reports that acquirers of Indian target firms earned significantly positive 
abnormal returns which averaged 1.71% for the fourteen-day event period around announcement 
date (ten days prior to three days post announcement date). Kale notes that although acquisitions 
in developed markets do not on average create significant value for acquirers, this may not be the 
case in India due to less competition in the country’s M&A market at the time.  
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Nagano and Yuan (2012) analyze acquisitions of Indian target firms with announcement 
dates ranging from 1998 to 2006. The paper finds that acquisitions, including purchases of 
private targets and acquisitions by foreign acquirers, increased greatly in the early 2000s. 
Average abnormal returns for acquirers of Indian firms were positive for both domestic and 
cross-border acquirers, but cross-border acquirers had significantly higher abnormal returns on 
average. Again, these findings do not align with research on developed-economy M&A markets, 
where acquirer value creation around announcement date has been found to be neutral or slightly 
negative in many cases. 
c. Mergers & Acquisitions by Indian Acquirers 
Research focusing on acquisitions by Indian acquirers also reports significantly positive 
abnormal acquirer value creation, as measured by cumulative abnormal stock returns around 
announcement date. Banerjee et al. (2014) examine Indian acquirer returns in three distinct time 
periods: 1991 to 2003, 2004 to 2007, and 2008 to 2011. Using a five-day event period around 
announcement date (two days prior to two days post announcement date) to analyze 538 
acquisitions, the work reports that Indian acquirers earned abnormal positive returns, on average, 
from 1995 to 2007, but negative average abnormal returns from 2008 to 2011. Particularly, from 
1995 to 2003, Indian acquirers earned abnormal positive returns of 2.96%, while from 2004 to 
2007, they earned abnormal positive returns of 2.80%. From 2008 to 2011, average abnormal 
returns became negative but insignificant at -0.10%. 
 In their study of 268 domestic full acquisitions with announcement dates ranging from 
2003 to 2008, Rani, Yadav, and Jain find that Indian acquirers earned significantly positive 
abnormal returns for three (-1 to +1), five (-2 to +2), and eleven-day (-5 to +5) event periods 
surrounding announcement date. The paper also finds that acquirer abnormal returns were 
significantly positive pre-announcement date and on announcement date but became negative in 
post-announcement date event periods. Additionally, acquirers of private Indian firms produced 
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more value around acquisition announcement than acquirers of public Indian targets, which is 
consistent with standard findings of developed-country M&A markets.   
d. Current Overview   
The Indian M&A market has grown significantly over the past few decades. According to 
Mergermarket, in 2018 merger and acquisition activity in India was valued at a record $99.9 
billion, which was roughly 2.8% of the $3.53 trillion of global M&A deal value in 2018. India 
was the second-most targeted country in the world for M&A in 2018, and as the globe’s fastest 
growing large economy, the nation holds great potential for future M&A expansion.  
Despite the large growth of M&A in India, there appears to be a lag in research regarding 
value creation around announcement date for acquirers of Indian firms. This paper seeks to 
contribute updated information regarding abnormal value creation around acquisition 
announcement for acquirers of Indian firms by analyzing a sample of acquisitions with 
announcement dates ranging from 2000 to 2018. This should provide a more up-to-date overview 
and lead to a better understanding of changes in the Indian M&A market over time.  
III. Other Relevant Merger & Acquisition Research  
a. Value Creation by Domestic versus Cross-Border Acquirers 
There is some disagreement in research findings regarding performance of domestic 
versus cross-border acquirers. In developed-market M&A research, Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2005) analyze 4,430 acquisitions by United States acquirers from 1985 to 1995. They find that, 
on average, cross-border acquirers produce about 1% less value, in the form of cumulative 
abnormal returns around announcement date, than domestic acquirers. Conversely, Kale (2004) 
reports that cross-border acquirers of Indian target firms had greater cumulative abnormal returns 
around announcement date than domestic acquirers of Indian targets. However, Kale found that 
this difference decreased over time, most likely due to increases in acquisition experience for 
Indian acquiring firms. Nagano and Yuan (2012) also found that from 1998 to 2006, cross-border 
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acquisitions of Indian target firms led to greater abnormal acquirer value creation than domestic 
acquisitions of Indian companies. 
b. Value Creation by Acquirers of Private Targets versus Acquirers of  Public 
Targets 
 As discussed by Koeplin, Sarin, and Shapiro (2000), there is consensus that a discount is 
applied to private firms, when compared to similar public firms, in corporate valuation. This 
discount is due to the illiquidity of private companies and often leads to higher returns around 
announcement date for acquirers of private targets than for acquirers of public targets. This 
concept appears to hold in developing-market acquisitions, as Nagano and Yuan (2012) report 
that cross-border acquirers of private Indian firms created higher abnormal value around 
announcement date, on average, than cross-border acquirers of public Indian firms. 
c. Value Creation by Small versus Large Acquirers  
 Previous research has reported that small acquirers have higher abnormal value creation 
around acquisition announcement than large acquirers. For example, Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz (2004) examine the abnormal returns to American acquirers in more than 12,000 domestic 
full acquisitions from 1980 to 2001. The three-day (-1 to +1) CAR value for the full sample is 
significantly positive at 1.10%, but small acquirers have significantly higher abnormal value 
creation than large acquirers, with three-day CAR values of 2.32% and 0.08%, respectively. This 
difference is attributed to large firms paying higher premiums and pursuing acquisitions with 
negative dollar synergies, both of which can be explained by greater managerial hubris in large 
acquirers. Note that these authors define small firms as companies with market capitalizations in 
the bottom 25th percentile of firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange in a given year, while 






The first hypothesis of this research is that cumulative abnormal stock returns around 
announcement date will become closer to zero, or even slightly negative, over time for acquirers 
of Indian firms, which would be more consistent with acquirer CAR values in developed M&A 
markets. This paper analyzes a sample of acquisitions with more recent announcement dates than 
other available research on the subject, so average acquirer CAR values around announcement 
date are predicted to be closer to zero, or more negative, than previously found. If acquirer 
returns in initial years examined in this research are abnormally positive, as was found in 
previous research by Kale (2004), Ma, Pagan, and Chu (2009), and Nagano and Yuan (2012), 
returns are predicted to decrease over time due to increased efficiency and volume in the Indian 
M&A market that began with the introduction of the country’s New Industrial Policy in 1991.  
The second hypothesis of this research is that cross-border acquirers of Indian targets will 
have higher cumulative abnormal stock returns around announcement date than domestic 
acquirers, as was previously found by Kale (2004) and Nagano and Yuan (2012). Cross-border 
acquirers will create higher abnormal value around acquisition announcement than domestic 
acquirers due to their greater level of experience with M&A.  
The third hypothesis of this research is that acquirers of private Indian firms will have 
higher CAR values around announcement date than acquirers of public Indian firms, as previous 
research has consistently found that a discount is applied to private firms due to illiquidity. The 
private firm discount leads to lower acquisition prices and therefore greater acquirer returns. 
 The fourth hypothesis of this research is that small acquirers, which includes firms with 
revenue below the sample median prior to acquisition announcement, will have higher CAR 
values around acquisition announcement than large acquirers, or firms with revenue above the 
sample median prior to acquisition announcement. This difference is due to managerial hubris in 
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large firms, which leads to paying higher acquisition prices and pursuing deals with negative 
cash synergies, as reported by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004). 
To test these hypotheses, cumulative abnormal return (CAR) values will be generated 
through event study methodology. Unique Market Model equations will be created and used to 
calculate expected stock returns for each acquirer in the sample. Daily abnormal returns will be 
calculated by comparing actual and expected acquirer daily stock returns and then combined 
over event periods of fourteen days (-10 to +3) and three days (-1 to +1) to produce CAR values. 
Regression analysis will then be used to analyze changes in CAR values over time.  
Summary of Hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1: Average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) values will become 
closer to zero over time for acquirers of Indian firms  
• Hypothesis 2: Cross-border acquirers of Indian firms will create more value around 
acquisition announcement, as measured by cumulative abnormal stock returns, 
than domestic acquirers 
• Hypothesis 3: Acquirers of private Indian firms will create more value around 
acquisition announcement, as measured by cumulative abnormal stock returns, 
than acquirers of public Indian firms  
• Hypothesis 4: Small acquirers of Indian firms (which includes firms with revenue 
below the sample median prior to acquisition announcement) will create more value 
around acquisition announcement, as measured by cumulative abnormal stock 






Methodology and Analysis  
Variables used in this research include actual acquirer stock returns, expected acquirer 
stock returns, and abnormal acquirer stock returns. Abnormal returns are defined as the 
difference between actual acquirer stock returns and expected acquirer stock returns, as predicted 
by a Market Model equation. Abnormal acquirer stock returns measure unexpected shareholder 
value creation, as it is standard to consider acquisitions zero net present value (NPV) transactions 
for acquirers in efficient markets today. That is, acquirers are not expected to have abnormal 
stock returns around announcement date. 
To obtain a list of historical mergers and acquisitions relevant to this research, 
Bloomberg’s M&A database was used. To generate a representative list of mergers and 
acquisitions, the following search criteria were applied: announcement date range of January 1, 
1986 to October 2018 (1986 was selected because it is five years prior to the lifting of many 
restrictions prohibiting M&A in Indian in 1991); deal type of M&A and majority purchase 
(acquirer intends to purchase more than 50% of the target firm at time of announcement); 
acquirers limited to public firms; and target firm country limited to India. Transactions meeting 
the above criteria were sorted by deal size, and the fifty-five transactions with the largest 
announced total value were selected for the sample. Acquisitions were omitted if determined to 
be strictly for financial purposes (acquirer sector listed as ‘financials’ on Bloomberg), no single 
acquirer purchased a majority stake in acquisitions with multiple acquirers, or necessary 
information was not available for an acquirer. The resulting sample of acquisitions had 
announcement dates ranging from 2000 to 2018.  
Data to calculate actual stock returns for each acquirer in the sample were obtained 
through Bloomberg. Daily actual returns were calculated throughout event periods using the 
following formula: ("#$%&'(	*+&",-.$*,'&'(	*+&",-)
$*,'&'(	*+&",-
. A fourteen-day (ten trading days prior to one 
19 
 
trading day post announcement date) and a three-day (one trading day prior to one trading day 
post announcement date) were used. 
To calculate expected acquirer stock returns, the event study Market Model was used. 
The Market Model equation is: R&1 	= 	α& + 		b&R51 	+ 	e&1, 			𝐸(	e&1) = 0, 𝑣𝑎𝑟(	e&1) = 𝜎	e-=
>  , 
where R&1 is the period t return on stock i, R51 is the period t return on the market portfolio, and 
	e&1 is the zero mean disturbance term. The market model parameters are  α&, 	b& , and	𝜎	e-=
> , and 
they were estimated using ordinary least squares techniques (MacKinlay 18). A Market Model 
equation was created for each acquirer in the sample by regressing daily acquirer stock returns 
(dependent or “y” variable) on daily index returns (independent or “x” variable) over an 
estimation period of 283 to 22 trading days prior to acquisition announcement date. The index 
used to represent the market portfolio was selected based on the country in which the acquirer is 
incorporated. For example, the Nifty Fifty index was used for acquirers incorporated in India 
with stock listed on the National Stock Exchange of India, while the S&P 500 was used for 
acquirers incorporated in the United States. Index values were also found through Bloomberg. 
The same index used to create the Market Model equation was then used to calculate 
daily index returns for each acquirer in the sample over the event periods. The following 
equation was used to calculate daily index returns, which estimate daily market portfolio returns: 
("#$%&'(	*+&",-.$*,'&'(	*+&",-)
$*,'&'(	*+&",-
.  Daily market portfolio returns were then used as the independent 
variable in generated Market Model equations to calculate expected daily stock returns for each 
acquirer over the event periods. Expected daily stock returns were then subtracted from actual 
stock returns from corresponding dates to produce abnormal stock return values for each 
acquirer. Abnormal stock return values were then combined over both event periods to create 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) values, one for the fourteen-day event period and one for the 
three-day event period. 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅 = ∑ F𝑅&1 − 𝑅H&1I		
1J
&K1L   
1 𝑅H&1 = expected stock return for time t, α& = intercept, b&	= measure of stock’s market risk, R51	= market return for time t, e&1	= zero mean disturbance term 
2  RMNO = expected stock return for time t, RNO = actual stock return for time t, tQ = first day of event period, tR = last day of event period 
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) values were then analyzed using one- and two-
sample t-tests and regression analysis to test the hypotheses listed above. The full sample of 
fifty-five acquisitions and subgroups were analyzed to see how CAR values change over time 
and if significant differences exist between groups. To examine changes in CAR values over 
time, independent variables of year (where 2000 = 1, 2001 = 2, 2002 = 3, …2018 = 19) and time 
periods of pre-2008, 2008-2011, and post-2011 were used. Acquirer revenue, announced total 
value, domestic versus cross-border acquirers, and acquirers of private versus public Indian firms 
were also examined as independent variables in regressions to explore their relationships with 





 Of the fifty-five acquisitions in the sample, twelve were announced in the years 2000 to 
2007 (pre-2008), fifteen were announced from 2008 to 2011, and twenty-eight were announced 
from 2012 to 2018 (post-2011). Twenty-three of the fifty-five acquisitions were domestic (both 
acquirer and target firm incorporated in India) and thirty-two were cross-border (acquirer 
incorporated outside of India and target firm incorporated in India). The full sample had an 
average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) value of -1.87% for the fourteen-day event period (-
10 to +3) and an average CAR value of -1.05% for the three-day event period (-1 to +1). In one-
sample t-tests where the null hypothesis stated that average CAR values equal zero, the average 
fourteen-day CAR value had a p-value of 0.1224, while the average three-day CAR value had a 
p-value of 0.1255. The negative average acquirer CAR values were different from results of 
previous research which found that acquirers of Indian firms had significantly positive abnormal 
stock returns around announcement date. The main difference between this research and 
previous research examined was the announcement dates of acquisitions studied, with this paper 
analyzing acquisitions with more recent announcement dates. This may indicate that 
opportunities for acquirers of Indian firms to earn abnormal positive stock returns around the 
announcement of an acquisition, on average, have disappeared over time. This will be explored 
further throughout this section. 
 To begin to examine differences in CAR values across time and between subgroups, 
average fourteen-day and three-day CAR values were compared over three time periods of pre-
2008, 2008 to 2011, and post-2011 (based on findings by Banerjee et al. (2014)) and between 
subgroups of domestic versus cross-border acquirers, acquirers of private Indian firms versus 
acquirers of public Indian firms, and acquirers with annual revenue below the sample median 
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(small acquirers) versus acquirers with annual revenue above the sample median (large 
acquirers). Prior to 2008, the average fourteen-day CAR value was 2.06% for acquirers of Indian 
targets, while the average three-day CAR value was slightly negative at -0.08%. The pre-2008 
group was most similar to samples in other available research on the subject in terms of dates 
considered, and although it was not significantly different from zero, the positive average 
fourteen-day CAR value resembled past findings. From 2008 to 2011, which coincides with the 
global financial crisis, the average fourteen-day CAR value was -6.18%, while the average three-
day CAR value was -3.13%. In the post-2011 time period, average CAR values remained 
negative but had smaller absolute values than in the previous period, with an average fourteen-
day CAR value of -1.24%, and an average three-day CAR value of -0.35%. The 2008 to 2011 
fourteen-day average CAR value had a relatively small t-test p-value of 0.1034, while the post-
2011 fourteen-day average CAR value had an even smaller t-test p-value of 0.0815. Although the 
post-2011 fourteen-day CAR value was significantly different than zero at the 0.10 alpha level, 
its negative value and magnitude were more similar to the zero-to-slightly negative short-term 
acquirer stock returns expected in developed markets.  
 Both domestic and cross-border acquirers had negative average fourteen-day and three-
day CAR values. Domestic acquirers had less negative (smaller absolute value) average CAR 
values for both event periods, although the difference between the averages was not significant 
(p = 0.98), as measured by a two-sample t-test. This was still an unexpected result and opposed 
Hypothesis 2.  
Acquirers of both private and public Indian targets also had negative average CAR values 
for the fourteen-day and three-day event periods, but the CAR values were less negative for 
acquirers of public firms in both event periods. This was also an unexpected result and 
contradicted Hypothesis 3, as previous research has consistently found that acquirers of private 
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target firms perform better around acquisition announcement. The average fourteen-day CAR 
value for acquirers of public Indian firms was approximately 3.24 percentage points higher than 
the average fourteen-day CAR value for acquirers of private Indian firms. There was some 
evidence that CAR values were different between the two subgroups with a p-value of 0.20.  
Small and large acquirers, as measured by having annual revenues below or above the 
sample median prior to acquisition announcement, both had negative average CAR values for the 
two event periods studied, with larger acquirers having less negative average abnormal returns in 
both event periods. However, the 0.89 percentage point difference between the two fourteen-day 
average CAR values was not significant when compared using a two-sample t-test (p = 0.72). 
This was still an unexpected result and opposed Hypothesis 4, which states that small acquirers 
are predicted to create higher abnormal value around acquisition announcement due to 
managerial hubris in large acquirers.  
Fourteen-day CAR values were more statistically significant than three-day CAR values 
and the focus of the remainder of this paper. Average cumulative abnormal return values, along 
with one-sample two-sided t-test statistical significance, are highlighted in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: Average Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) Values 
 
 Significance Levels: *** p < 0.05, **p < 0.10 , * p < 0.20 
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Average 14-Day CAR Values by Time Period  
 Next, changes in average fourteen-day CAR values were examined across the three time 
periods of pre-2008, 2008 to 2011, and post-2011 for the six subgroups of interest: domestic 
acquirers, cross-border acquirers, acquirers of private Indian firms, acquirers of public Indian 
firms, acquirers with annual revenues below the sample median (small acquirers), and acquirers 
with annual revenues above the sample median (large acquirers).  
 Prior to 2008, average fourteen-day CAR values were positive for the full sample, 
domestic acquirers, acquirers of public targets, and small acquirers. Additionally, the full sample 
and all subgroups had negative average CAR values from 2008 to 2011. In the post-2011 time 
period, the large acquirer subgroup had a positive average fourteen-day CAR value, although it 
was very small in magnitude, while the full sample and all other subgroups had negative average 
CAR values. In absolute value terms, post-2011 average CAR values were the smallest of the 
three time period averages for the full sample and each subgroup. In other words, post-2011 
average CAR values are closest to zero, and a trend towards zero average cumulative abnormal 
returns around announcement date for acquirers of Indian target firms appears to exist.  
Figure 1: Average 14-Day Acquirer CAR Values by Time Period 
 
 




























Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) Values over Time  
 Next, individual acquirer fourteen-day CAR values were examined by year to determine 
if trends exist and how potential trends might differ between subgroups. Full sample and 
subgroup acquirer CAR values were plotted against announcement year and trend lines were fit 
to the data. These trend lines represent simple regressions in the form of 𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 +
𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒 ∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟.	 In Figures 2 through 8 below, each circle represents a single 











Figure 2: Full Sample – 14-Day CAR vs. Year 



















                 
                                          
 
                 
 





























Figure 3: Domestic Acquirers – 14-Day CAR vs. Year Figure 4: Cross-Border Acquirers – 14-Day CAR vs. Year 
Year (2000 = 1, 2018 = 19) Year (2000 = 1, 2018 = 19) 
Year (2000 = 1, 2018 = 19) 































                
 
As seen in Figure 2 above, the trend line for the relationship between CAR values and 
year for the full data set was downward-sloping. However, the slope coefficient was not 
statistically significant, as seen in the data for Regression 1 (column 2) in Table 2 below. 
Differences in CAR value trends between subgroups are shown in Figures 3 through 8, where for 
each set of subgroups (domestic versus cross-border acquirers, acquirers of private targets versus 
acquirers of public targets, and small versus large acquirers) trend lines slope in opposite 
directions. The slope coefficients for acquirers of public targets, small acquirers, and large 
acquirers were all significant at an alpha level of 0.20.  
 Although the slope coefficients of these regressions were not statistically significant at 
small p-values, that may at least partially be due to the relatively small sample size. The trend 
lines above still indicate that there may be important differences in changes in CAR values over 
time between subgroups, especially when considering average CAR values prior to 2008 and 
trends over time. For the groups that had positive average CAR values prior to 2008 (the full 
sample, domestic acquirers, acquirers of public targets, and small acquirers), as seen in Figure 1, 
trend lines for the relationship between CAR values and year were downward-sloping. 





























Figure 7: Small Acquirers – 14-Day CAR vs. Year 
 




Oppositely, for the groups that had negative average CAR values prior to 2008 (cross-border 
acquirers, acquirers of private targets, and large acquirers), trend lines for the relationship 
between CAR values and year were upward-sloping. Even without strong statistical significance, 
the fact that slope coefficients in trend lines were positive (negative) when average pre-2008 
CAR values were negative (positive) supports the prediction that abnormal acquirer returns are 
trending toward zero over time in the Indian M&A market, as stated in Hypothesis 1.  
Regressions with Year as Time Variable  
 In Table 2 below, Regressions 1 through 7 (columns 2 through 8) correspond with 
Figures 2 through 8 (pages 25-27) and are in the form of 𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒 ∗
𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 that was discussed in the previous section. Next, to explore if the 
relationship between CAR values and year strengthened when other explanatory variables were 
included in regressions, three to four additional explanatory variables were added to regression 
equations: log acquirer revenue, log announced total value, a dummy for private versus public 
target firms (where a dummy of one is used for acquisitions of public firms), and a dummy for 
domestic versus cross-border acquisitions (where a dummy of one is used for cross-border 
acquisitions).   
 In Table 2, Regressions 8 through 14 (columns 9 through 15) show that all slope 
coefficients maintained their respective signs when additional explanatory variables were added 
to regressions. Additionally, the magnitude of the respective year variable coefficients remained 
relatively similar between the two sets of regressions (single variable and multivariable). The 
domestic acquirer subgroup slope coefficient became significantly negative at the 0.20 alpha 
level with the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. Conversely, slope coefficients for  
the private-target acquirer and large acquirer subgroups were no longer significant at the 0.15 
alpha level when additional explanatory variables were included in regressions. Overall, 
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accounting for additional variables did not strengthen the statistical significance of the 
relationship between CAR values and year, which could potentially be due to a degree of multi-
collinearity between year and the other explanatory variables. As seen in Table 2, coefficients for 
the public target dummy variable were significantly positive in multiple regressions, which was a 
surprising result and contradicted Hypothesis 3.  
Table 2: Summary of Regressions with Year as Time Variable (14-Day CAR Values) 
 
 
Regressions with Time Period Dummies as Explanatory Variables 
 Here, time periods of pre-2008, 2008-2011, and post-2011 were used to analyze changes 
in CAR values over time by using dummies for the 2008-2011 and post-2011 time periods. 
Again, these time periods were chosen because of evidence provided by Banerjee et al. (2014) 
regarding distinct periods in India’s economic history and their alignment with the Global 
Financial Crisis.  
 First, regressions were generated with only the time period dummies serving as 
explanatory variables, and the results are shown in Regressions 1 through 7 (columns 2 through 
8) in Table 3 below. These regressions correspond with Figure 1 on page 24, which highlights 
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.05, **p < 0.10 , * p < 0.20 
In each box, top value is coefficient; value in parentheses is t-statistic  
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average CAR values for the full sample and each subgroup over the three time periods analyzed. 
The coefficients on all dummy variables for the 2008-2011 time period were negative and many 
were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha level. The signs on the post-2011 dummy variables 
follow a pattern similar to the one found when year was used as the variable for time: if a group 
had a positive average CAR value prior to 2008, the coefficient on the post-2011 dummy 
variable was negative, while if a group had a negative average CAR value prior to 2008, the 
coefficient on the post-2011 dummy variable was positive. In other words, if the coefficient on 
the year variable was positive (negative), the post-2011 dummy variable coefficient was positive 
(negative), which occurred when the average CAR value for the group was negative (positive) 
prior to 2008. 
  Similar to the multivariable regressions with year as the time variable, the inclusion of 
additional explanatory variables did not increase the significance of the relationship between 
CAR values and time periods. The signs on time period dummy variable coefficients remained 
the same when additional explanatory variables were added to regressions for all groups except 
large acquirers, where the sign changed on the post-2011 dummy variable in the multivariable 
regression as compared to the regression with only time period dummies. In general, the 
magnitude of coefficients on time period dummies also remained relatively similar when 
additional explanatory variables were included in regressions.   
 As was also found in the regressions with year as the time variable, the public target 
dummy variable coefficients were positive and significant at relatively low alpha levels, as seen 




















Significance Levels: *** p < 0.05, **p < 0.10 , * p < 0.20 




Overview of Average CAR Values 
This research analyzes fifty-five acquisitions of Indian target firms with announcement 
dates from 2000 to 2018, providing some of the most up-to-date insights on abnormal acquirer 
value creation around announcement date, as measured by abnormal stock returns, that could be 
found. Initially, cumulative abnormal return (CAR) values were calculated for two event periods 
of different lengths: fourteen days (-10 to +3) and three days (-1 to +1). CAR values for the 
fourteen-day event period were more statistically significant and the main focus of this paper, 
while additional information on three-day event period results can be found in the appendices.  
For the fourteen-day event period, the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) value 
for the full sample was -1.87%, which produced a p-value of 0.1224 in a two-sided one-sample t-
test. When broken into time periods, the twelve acquisitions that were announced prior to 2008 
had a positive average fourteen-day CAR value of 2.06%, but it was not significantly different 
from zero (p = 0.3981). The fifteen acquisitions that were announced from 2008 to 2011 had a 
negative average fourteen-day CAR value of -6.18%, which produced a two-sided t-test p-value 
of 0.1034. A majority of the acquisitions in the sample, twenty-eight, had announcement dates 
that occurred post-2011. The average fourteen-day CAR value for this time period was -1.24% 
(two-sided t-test p-value = 0.0815). 
In previously published research that analyzed mergers and acquisitions involving Indian 
target firms with announcement dates from 1992 to 2002, acquirer CAR values around 
announcement date were found to be significantly greater than zero. Other research also found 
that Indian acquirer firms earned positive abnormal returns around announcement date from 
1995 to 2007. In this paper, the pre-2008 group was most similar to previous research in terms of 
announcement dates considered, so the fact that the average CAR value for that time period was 
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positive, but not statistically significant, was partially consistent with previous results. Because 
the full-sample had an average CAR value of -1.87%, which produced a p-value of 0.1224 in a 
two-sided t-test, and the post-2011 acquisition group had an average CAR value that was 
negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 alpha level, results of this paper differed from 
previous findings on the subject. These differences may indicate that Indian economic efficiency 
and M&A market saturation have increased over time. These changes could have weakened the 
ability of acquirers of Indian firms to earn positive abnormal returns upon acquisition 
announcement and instead led to zero-to-slightly negative abnormal value creation, which is a 
typical result in developed-country M&A markets and may indicate India’s own M&A market 
development. These findings supported Hypothesis 1.  
When average abnormal value creation around announcement date was compared for 
subgroups within the data sample, domestic acquirers had a less negative average CAR value 
than cross-border acquirers. Although the two average values were not significantly different, 
this was still an unexpected result and opposed Hypothesis 2, as previous research found that 
cross-border acquirers of Indian firms performed better around acquisition announcement. 
Additionally, acquirers of public target firms had a less negative average CAR value than 
acquirers of private firms (two-sample t-test p-value = 0.20), which opposed Hypothesis 3 and 
was a particularly unexpected result due to the consistent finding of a private company valuation 
discount in other research. Large acquirers also had a less negative average fourteen-day CAR 
value than small acquirers, which opposed Hypothesis 4 and was unexpected due to previous 
findings of large-firm managerial hubris in acquisitions.  
These results require further exploration to determine if they uncovered reliable, and 
potentially extremely useful, insights, or if they should just be attributed to a relatively small 
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sample size. If they are determined to be reliable and potentially uncover unique characteristics 
of the Indian M&A market, factors that could lead to these anomalies should also be researched.  
Progression of Average CAR Values Over Time  
Next, the full sample was divided into subgroups based on acquisition characteristics, and 
average CAR values over time were analyzed. Figure 1 shows that the greatest variation in 
average CAR values occurred prior to 2008, where the full sample, domestic acquirers, acquirers 
of public target firms, and small acquirers all had positive average CAR values, while cross-
border acquirers, acquirers of private target firms, and large acquirers had negative average CAR 
values. The full sample and all subgroups had negative average CAR values for the 2008 to 2011 
time period, which was most likely due to the Global Financial Crisis and shows that India was 
affected by the global recession, highlighting the country’s connection to the global economy. 
The full sample and all subgroups, except large acquirers, had negative average CAR values for 
the post-2011 time period. 
For the full sample and all subgroups, the post-2011 average CAR values had the 
smallest absolute values when compared to respective pre-2008 and 2008 to 2011 average CAR 
values. In other words, post-2011 average CAR values were closer to zero in terms of magnitude. 
For the full sample and the six subgroups analyzed, there is a defined trend of average CAR 
values moving closer to zero over the time periods analyzed, as seen in Figure 1. Although 
differences between average CAR values in varying time periods were not statistically 
significant in all cases (as denoted in regressions 1 through 7 in Table 3), there still appears to be 
a trend toward zero average CAR values, and statistical significance could potentially increase 
with a larger sample size, which would be ideal for this research. Again, the transition toward 
average CAR values that were closer to zero, or smaller in magnitude, could represent the 
progression of the Indian M&A market toward a more-developed M&A system. By the post-
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2011 time period, average CAR returns for the full sample and all subgroups more closely 
resembled expected abnormal returns to acquirers around acquisition announcement in 
developed countries. 
Regressions with Year as Explanatory Variable  
 As seen in Figures 2 through 8, regressions for the full sample and six subgroups that 
examine the relationship between year and individual fourteen-day CAR values sloped in 
different directions. Full sample, domestic acquirers, acquirers of public targets, and small 
acquirers had downward-sloping regression lines, while cross-border acquirers, acquirers of 
private targets, and large acquirers had upward-sloping regression lines. Slopes for acquirers of 
private targets, small acquirers, and large acquirers were significant at the 0.20 alpha level, as 
seen in Table 2. Although increased statistical significance would strengthen findings, 
significance could potentially be improved with a larger sample size. All groups with downward-
sloping regressions had positive average fourteen-day CAR values prior to 2008, while all 
groups with upward-sloping regressions had negative average fourteen-day CAR values prior to 
2008. This finding strengthens Hypothesis 1, which predicts that average CAR values around 
announcement date for acquirers of Indian firms are trending toward zero over time or becoming 
more consistent with abnormal returns around announcement date for acquirers in developed 
markets. 
 When adding additional explanatory variables to regressions with year as the variable for 
time, the relationship between year and CAR values did not change significantly. The sign on all 
year variable coefficients remained the same and the magnitude of the coefficients also remained 
relatively similar. At the same time, statistical significance of the coefficients did not improve 
when additional explanatory variables were included in regressions. This could be due to 
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moderate multi-collinearity between year and other explanatory variables but was not a major 
concern because coefficient values were not heavily influenced.  
As seen in Table 2, r-squared values, which indicate the proportion of variance in CAR 
values explained by independent variables used in regressions, typically increased when 
additional explanatory variables were added to regressions but were still relatively small. 
Additionally, adjusted r-squared values were significantly smaller than unadjusted r-squared 
values. Although the multivariable regressions included many of the most common, and 
significant, predictors of CAR values, a large portion of the variation in abnormal returns to 
acquirers of Indian firms around announcement date remained unexplained by these models. 
Adding other explanatory variables to regressions that better explain the variation in CAR values 
over time would be a main goal of future research.  
Regressions with Time Period Dummies as Explanatory Variables 
 Table 3 provides an overview of regressions that include dummies for time periods of 
2008 to 2011 and post-2011 (compared to pre-2008). Large variation in average fourteen-day 
CAR values between groups existed prior to 2008, when the full sample and three subgroups had 
positive average CAR values, while the remaining three subgroups had negative average CAR 
values. From 2008 to 2011, the full sample and all groups had negative average fourteen-day 
CAR values. This time period coincides with the Global Financial Crisis, and the fact that 
averages in this period were much more negative than those for the pre-2008 and post-2011 time 
periods indicates that the crisis affected India’s M&A market and highlights India’s 
connectedness with the global economy. Post-2011 average CAR values were also negative for 
the full sample and all subgroups, except large acquirers, which had a very small positive 
average CAR value of 0.04%. There was a reduction in the magnitude of average CAR values 
through time periods analyzed, with post-2011 averages closest to zero (in terms of magnitude). 
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Although not all differences between time periods were statistically significant (shown in 
regressions 1 through 7 in Table 3), many were, and a trend toward smaller-magnitude average 
CAR values was apparent. This evidence supports Hypothesis 1, which predicts that average 
CAR values around announcement date for acquirers of Indian firms are trending toward those of 
acquirers in developed-country M&A markets, which are expected to be zero-to-slightly 
negative. This progression of average CAR values is shown visually in Figure 1.  
When adding additional explanatory variables to regressions with time period dummies, 
the relationship between time period and CAR values did not greatly change in most cases. The 
signs on all time period dummy coefficients remained the same for all groups, expect large 
acquirers, when additional explanatory variables were included. The magnitude of coefficients 
also remained relatively similar. Still, statistical significance of time period dummy coefficients 
did not improve when additional explanatory variables were included in regressions, which could 
be due to moderate multi-collinearity between time period dummies and other explanatory 
variables, as already mentioned above. 
Based on r-squared and adjusted r-squared values, regressions using time period dummies 
appear to explain the variation in CAR values better than those using year as the time variable. 
Despite the improvement, r-squared values were still relatively low when time period dummies 
were used, and although they increased when additional explanatory variables were added, they 
remained relatively small. Adjusted r-squared values were also significantly smaller than 
unadjusted r-squared values for the multivariable regressions. Because of this, once again, a main 
goal of future research would be to improve regressions and account for a greater portion of 





Implications and Future Research 
 Through this paper, evidence has been presented to show that the Indian M&A market is 
potentially becoming more like a developed-country M&A market over time, at least for 
acquirers of Indian firms. This is most likely due to increased competition in the Indian M&A 
market since 1991, when the New Industrial Policy was enacted as the first step in liberalizing 
the Indian economy, and the early 2000s, which is argued to be the time period in which the 
Indian economy and M&A market were truly freed. Because average acquirer cumulative 
abnormal returns around announcement date appear to be shrinking in magnitude over time, the 
Indian M&A market can be considered more predictable today. This means that the likelihood of 
acquirers earning large abnormally positive or negative returns around announcement of the 
acquisition of an Indian firm has decreased over time. 
 If the Indian M&A market is truly functioning more like a developed-nation M&A 
market today, it can be argued that M&A activity in the country will continue to expand as 
developed countries, like the United States, account for the largest percentage of global M&A 
activity in the world. Companies potentially interested in acquiring an Indian firm can use this 
research to see how the market has changed over time and how acquirers today, on average, are 
performing around acquisition announcement. This paper can also show companies which 
acquirer and acquisition characteristics have led to the most success in the past and then assist 
them in making decisions accordingly. 
 Future research should focus on examining up-to-date abnormal returns, or value 
creation, around announcement date for acquirers of Indian firms, but with a larger sample size, 
as that is the most limiting factor of this paper. Additionally, future research should seek to find 
explanatory variables that better explain the variation in CAR values for acquirers of Indian 
firms and include those in regressions that result in larger adjusted r-squared values. Lastly, 
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future research could examine different features of the Indian M&A market that may potentially 
explain the finding that acquirers of public Indian firms created more abnormal value around 
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Table 5: Summary of Regressions with Time Period Dummies (3-Day CAR Values) 
 
 
Significance Levels: *** p < 0.05, **p < 0.10 , * p < 0.20 
In each box, top value is coefficient; value in parentheses is t-statistic  
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